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Two studies addressed how people punish juvenile sex offenders in ambiguous punishment contexts. Sex
offender registry laws now make voluntary sexual activity between juveniles a registration-worthy
offense in the U.S. Using contemporary prejudice theories as a theoretical framework, we tested whether
the ambiguity surrounding the application of these laws to juveniles provides a context for expression of
prejudice against gay youth. In the ambiguous context of 2 juveniles having consensual sex, people
supported sex offender registration more for gay, versus heterosexual, offenders. This punishment
discrimination did not emerge, however, in the societally less ambiguous context of an adult having sex
with a juvenile. Study 2 revealed that punishment discrimination again emerged against gay male
juveniles but not lesbian juveniles. Across both studies, punishment discrimination against gay juveniles
was consistently mediated by retributive motives (moral outrage), but less consistently by utilitarian
motives (concern about protecting society)—the stated legislative purpose of registration.
Keywords: prejudice, discrimination, homosexuality, juvenile justice, punishment
Kaitlyn Hunt, an 18-year-old high school senior, was recently
charged with lewd and lascivious battery for engaging in voluntary
sexual activity with her 14-year-old freshman girlfriend (Harrison,
2013). After Kaitlyn turned 18, her girlfriend’s parents reported
the relationship to the police. Kaitlyn first rejected a plea bargain
for a lesser child abuse charge to avoid house arrest and public
stigmatization on the sex offender registry. Supporting her deci-
sion, her parents described sex offender registration as “life-
changing . . . a death sentence to all her future goals.” Eventually,
Kaitlyn pled “no contest” to a set of charges that would not require
her to register as a sex offender (battery, interference of child
custody, and contributing to the dependency of a child). As a
result, Kaitlyn is under house arrest for 2 years and on probation
for 3 years (Corcoran & Lanee, 2013).
Is public, and perhaps lifelong, stigmatization as a sex offender
an appropriate punishment in a case like Kaitlyn’s? Similar cases
of teenagers being registered as sex offenders for consensual
sexual activity with peers have sparked a national debate in the
media (Feyerick & Steffen, 2009) and academia (Trivits & Rep-
pucci, 2002) regarding appropriate punishment in these cases.
Convicted sex offenders must register information (e.g., name,
address, offense, photograph) with the police that is publicly
available online for 15 years to life. Sex offender registries were
designed to protect the public from dangerous, repeat sex offenders
preying upon children (Office of the Attorney General, 1999). Yet,
consensual sexual activity among juvenile peers also qualifies as a
sex offense under these laws (Adam Walsh Act, 2006)—even if
both parties are underage and participating voluntarily (James,
2009). Further, juveniles are indeed registered in these cases
(Human Rights Watch, 2007). Sex offender registration is a very
severe punishment resulting in pervasive negative consequences,
including job loss, home eviction, harassment, physical assault,
property damage, isolation, loss of close relationships, shame,
embarrassment, hopelessness, and so forth (e.g., Levenson,
D’Amora, & Hern, 2007). Although we are unaware of scientific
evidence regarding the frequency of this occurrence, advocacy
organizations and news stories have reported several instances in
which teenagers have committed suicide after being required or
threatened with the requirement to register as a sex offender
(Bellware, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2007; News.com.au,
2013). Juvenile sex offender registration is particularly controver-
sial because many critics argue that juveniles are less likely to
recidivate and are more amenable to treatment, compared to adult
sex offenders (Trivits & Reppucci, 2002).
As a result of these issues, there is considerable ambiguity
surrounding whether it is appropriate to apply these extremely
harsh sex offender registration laws to juveniles in these cases. In
the current studies, we tested whether this ambiguity surrounding
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juvenile (but not adult) cases would lead to discrimination against
a stigmatized group: gay youth. First, we will review contempo-
rary prejudice theories to explain why prejudice is particularly
likely to be expressed in ambiguous punishment contexts. Second,
we will explain how the application of sex offender registry laws
to juveniles engaged in voluntary sexual activity with a peer
qualifies as a relatively ambiguous context. Third, we will review
and propose punishment motives as potential psychological mech-




Crandall and Eshleman (2003) reviewed and incorporated sev-
eral contemporary “two factor” models of racial prejudice (e.g.,
aversive racism [Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986], modern prejudice
[McConahay, 1986], regressive racism [Rogers & Prentice-Dunn,
1981], automatic and controlled processes [Devine, 1989]) into
their Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice. The authors
highlight (a) that people acquire prejudice toward racial outgroups,
but also motivation to avoid expressing that prejudice, (b) sup-
pression factors that reduce people’s expression of prejudice, and
(c) justification factors that facilitate people’s expression of prej-
udice. In support of the current study predictions, the motivation to
suppress prejudice is released when the situation is ambiguous
because it is easier to justify prejudicial responses to the situation.
As a result, discrimination is more likely to manifest when the
situation is ambiguous (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Within their
aversive racism framework, Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) similarly
argue that, although blatant racial prejudice expression has de-
clined in contemporary American life, many people maintain neg-
ative feelings about historically stigmatized groups. Given that it is
less socially acceptable to express overtly racist sentiments in
contemporary society, they find that discrimination is more likely
to manifest in ambiguous contexts because the discrimination is
less obvious to oneself and others. Thus, contemporary forms of
racism are characterized by more subtle, indirect expressions of
prejudice, such as disadvantaging minorities in nonobvious ways.
Investigating these contemporary prejudice processes is particu-
larly important given that they might contribute to the institution-
alization of prejudice against stigmatized groups through selective
punishment and incarceration in our legal system. Previous studies
have indeed demonstrated a pattern of racial discrimination in
legal decision making consistent within the aversive racism frame-
work (for review, Dovidio, Gaertner, Penner, Pearson, & Norton,
2009). Specifically, people will judge a Black (vs. White) defen-
dant more harshly if they have an excuse unrelated to race (e.g.,
incriminating evidence). Discrimination is eliminated, however,
when people’s concerns about appearing racist are triggered during
the trial.
What about sexual prejudice? Although there have been inves-
tigations of sexual prejudice (e.g., Herek, 2000, 2009; Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2006; Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014; Whitley & Kite, 2006),
contemporary forms of prejudice against gays and lesbians have
received limited empirical attention (Massey, 2009) relative to
investigations of contemporary forms of racism. Similar to racial
prejudice, blatant prejudice against gay individuals is somewhat
subsiding. In the past, registration laws blatantly discriminated
against gay individuals by making consensual gay sex a
registration-worthy offense—even among consenting adults. Al-
though these laws were overturned, many individuals remain reg-
istered publicly due to past convictions. Further, explicit antigay
prejudice is declining more broadly (for review, Herek, 2009). In
fact, the decline of explicit opposition to gay marriage reflects one
of the largest changes in public opinion on a policy issue in the last
decade—although many remain opposed (43%) (Pew Research
Center, 2013).
Yet, subtle bias against gay individuals persists. One study
demonstrated that confederates wearing a hat stating “Gay and
proud” (vs. “Texan and proud”) did not experience blatant dis-
crimination when inquiring about job opportunities. The gay (vs.
control) confederates did, however, experience more subtle dis-
crimination during interactions with store employees (e.g., the
interactions were shorter and perceived more negatively, Hebl,
Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002). In a similar study, store clerks
helped confederates wearing a progay t-shirt less than confederates
not wearing the progay t-shirt (Hendren & Blank, 2009). Although
there have been some demonstrations of discrimination against gay
individuals in legal settings (e.g., Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, &
Nysse-Carris, 2002; Salerno et al., in press; Stawiski, Dykema-
Engblade, & Tindale, 2012; Walsh, 1994; Wiley & Bottoms, 2009,
2013), we know little relative to the decades of research investi-
gating racial discrimination in our legal system (e.g., Meissner &
Brigham, 2001; Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005; Som-
mers & Ellsworth, 2001; Sweeney & Haney, 1992). Further, there
is no research, to our knowledge, investigating factors that might
exacerbate contemporary forms of sexual discrimination specifi-
cally (i.e., ambiguous legal punishment contexts). The current
research addresses this gap in the literature.
Ambiguous Punishment Context: Juvenile Sex
Offender Registration
What makes the sex offender registration for juvenile offenders
a relatively more “ambiguous” punishment context than for adult
offenders? To be clear, we are not arguing that the law itself is
ambiguous: it is clear that anyone (a juvenile or adult) who has sex
with an underage individual has broken the law. Nor are we
arguing that there is anything inherently ambiguous about the
offense itself (i.e., engaging in sexual activity with an individual
under the age of consent). What is ambiguous, we argue, is
whether it is appropriate to apply these harsh sex offender regis-
tration laws (designed for adult offenders who have sex with
children) to juveniles engaged in voluntary sexual activity with
similarly aged peers.
Judgments about whether sex offender registration is appropri-
ate for adults who have sex with minors are relatively unambigu-
ous. These are the type of offenders for whom the registry was
designed: adults who take advantage of and abuse children (Trivits
& Reppucci, 2002). It is less clear, however, whether juveniles
engaged in voluntary sexual activity with a peer should be regis-
tered for these offenses. Sex offenses between juvenile peers fit the
letter—but not necessarily the spirit—of the registry laws (i.e.,
protecting the public from dangerous, repeat offenders [Office of
the Attorney General, 1999]). Some states have taken action to
disambiguate whether sex offender laws should be applied in these






































































































399GAY BIAS AND PUNISHMENT
immunity to statutory rape prosecution for “perpetrators” close in
age to “victims.” Note, however, that three states explicitly ex-
clude homosexual activity from this immunity, Higdon, 2008.
When Romeo and Juliet exceptions are not available, however,
deciding whether juvenile sex offenders in these cases should be
registered is a more ambiguous punishment context, compared to
more straightforward punishment decisions regarding adult sex
offenders. In fact, there is significantly less public consensus for
registering juveniles for voluntary sexual behavior with peers (e.g.,
consensual oral sex, “sexting” naked photographs) compared to
more serious, nonconsensual offenses (rape) committed by juve-
niles (Salerno, Najdowski et al., 2010).
Discrimination Against Gay and Lesbian Juvenile
Sex Offenders
The public might, however, support sex offender registration
more for juveniles—even in the less severe cases—if they are gay.
Kaitlyn Hunt’s case has received international attention because
many believe that her prosecution was a direct result of antigay
prejudice. Many additional cases have raised accusations that
consensual sexual activity among underage teenagers is selectively
prosecuted to target LGBT youth (Brydum, 2013). Unfortunately,
there are no statistics available, that we are aware of, regarding the
percentage of gay versus heterosexual registered sex offenders.
One study provides some indirect evidence, however, that gay
youth might be especially likely to be registered compared to gay
adults. Comparing characteristics of juvenile versus adult sex
offenders on the Texas Sex Offender Registry revealed that a
significantly larger percentage of juvenile offenders, relative to
adult offenders, had male victims (Craun & Kernsmith, 2006).
Because most offenders were men in this study (98%), this at least
suggests that male juvenile offenders who offend against other
boys might be particularly likely to be registered. Although the
authors did not address the possibility of antigay discrimination,
one intuitive explanation for these effects is that stigmatized ju-
veniles might be more likely to be registered than nonstigmatized
juveniles—whereas sexual orientation might have less impact for
adult offenders. The current study experimentally tests this hy-
pothesis and addresses legal scholars’ concern that gay youth
might be selectively prosecuted and punished for voluntary sexual
activity among similarly aged juveniles (e.g., James, 2009; Suther-
land, 2003).
Consistent with contemporary “two factor” prejudice theories
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), we expected punishment dis-
crimination to reflect prejudice that participants may be unwill-
ing or unable to report on explicit measures. If the hypothesized
discrimination effect were driven by old-fashioned, blatant prej-
udice, we would expect that only participants who are willing
and able to explicitly endorse antigay stereotypes would dis-
criminate against gay offenders. Instead, we expected the dis-
crimination effect to emerge as a result of more contemporary
prejudice, held among many American heterosexuals (e.g., Jel-
lison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004)—regardless of their ex-
plicit endorsement of antigay stereotypes. That is, similar to
contemporary prejudice effects, we suspected that discrimina-
tion against gay youth would be a result of subtle biases against
gay people, and therefore would not be isolated to old-
fashioned bigots who explicitly endorse gay stereotypes.
Potential Mediators of Contemporary Sexual
Prejudice: Punishment Motives
Demonstrations of aversive racism in legal contexts have not yet
investigated mediators that reflect the psychological processes that
underlie those effects (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner,
1997; Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005; Johnson,
Whitestone, Jackson, & Gatto, 1995; Knight, Giuliano, &
Sanchez-Ross, 2001; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). The present
research also contributes to the literature theoretically by examin-
ing mediators of contemporary antigay discrimination in ambigu-
ous punishment contexts. That is, why might people discriminate
against gay juveniles in punishment decisions? Psychological re-
search suggests two potential motives underlying punishment de-
cisions: retribution and utilitarian behavior control (Vidmar &
Miller, 1980).
Retributive Motives
The retributive perspective believes the value of punishment is
restoring the balance of justice. Punishment is the important out-
come, in and of itself. The goal is to determine punishment
proportionate to the amount of harm committed. People react to
these harms with moral outrage, which has been utilized as a
measure of retributive motives (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson,
2002). People report experiencing moral outrage when transgres-
sions violate their values (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004),
which can predict legal punishment (Salerno et al., 2010). Because
gay sex remains condemned as morally wrong by many (Herek,
2000), people might experience more moral outrage (a retributive
motive) toward gay (vs. heterosexual) offenders and in turn punish
the offender more harshly.
Utilitarian Motives
In contrast, the utilitarian perspective believes that the value of
punishment lies in the downstream effects of punishment: preven-
tion of future harm to society. Punishment is not an end in and of
itself, but instead a means to controlling future criminal behavior.
This perspective is more concerned with subsequent outcomes of
the punishment, such as incapacitation (i.e., punishing an offender
to deter him/her from reoffending). Because gay men have histor-
ically been stereotyped as sexually deviant and child molesters
(Herek, 1991, 2002), people might perceive gay (vs. heterosexual)
offenders as more likely to reoffend in the future (a utilitarian
motive), and in turn punish the offender more harshly.
Although the legislative purpose of sex offender registration is
explicitly utilitarian (i.e., to help parents protect their children from
dangerous, repeat sex offenders, SORNA; 42 U.S.C. § 16911),
reading about gay juvenile offenders might increase both utilitar-
ian and retributive motives for punishment. In general, whether
laypeople’s punishment decisions are driven by retributive or
utilitarian motives is debatable. Some studies demonstrate that
people punish because of utilitarian motives rather than retributive
motives (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997), while others find the
opposite (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008), and still others find that both
motives predict punishment severity (e.g., Darley, Carlsmith, &
Robinson, 2000). Both motives explain why juvenile rape offenses






































































































400 SALERNO, MURPHY, AND BOTTOMS
Salerno et al., 2010). We tested whether discrimination toward gay
(vs. heterosexual) juvenile offenders would be driven by retribu-
tive motives, utilitarian motives, or both.
Current Research
In two experiments, we examined whether people would dis-
criminate against gay (vs. heterosexual) offenders when the con-
text is ambiguous (i.e., juveniles engaged in consensual sexual
activity with underage peers), but not when the context is less
ambiguous (i.e., adult sex offenders engaged in sexual activity
with underage minors). We also tested whether discrimination
would occur independent of participants’ explicit endorsement of
gay stereotypes. In line with critiques of “one-size-fits-all” re-
search that assumes people’s reactions to one target of discrimi-
nation will generalize to another (Sommers & Babbitt, 2010), we
tested whether reactions to gay male juveniles would extend to
lesbian juveniles (Study 2). Across both studies, we empirically
examined the psychological mechanisms that might explain dis-




Participants and procedure. Participants were 212 voter-
eligible adults recruited from Study Response (http://studyresponse
.syr.edu/studyresponse) and Mechanical Turk (mturk.com;
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Forty-five participants were
excluded because they failed to correctly report the offender’s age
and/or the victim’s gender (i.e., the two experimental manipulations).
The remaining 167 participants were 54% women; 51% White, 38%
Asian, 7% Black, 2% Hispanic; with a mean age of 30 years (SD 
8).
Participants read a brief description of sex offender registration
laws and a case vignette based on an actual case (Wilson v. State,
AL 2006), in which “David” is charged with a sex offense for
videotaping a 14-year-old performing oral sex on him (see Appen-
dix). They read that David was either 16 (ambiguous peer sex) or
35 years old (nonambiguous adult–child sex), and the act was
performed by either a female (heterosexual sex) or male (gay sex)
14-year-old.
Measures.
Punishment. Participants indicated whether David should, in
order of increasing punitiveness: not be registered as a sex of-
fender; be registered as a sex offender, but not publicly online; or
be registered as a sex offender publicly online. This variable has
been utilized in previous research (Salerno, Najdowski et al., 2010)
and was treated as an ordinal outcome in all analyses.
Mediators. Participants completed a utilitarian motives scale
( . 83) and a retributive motives scale ( . 89), which were
related but not redundant, r  .65, p  .001. Although utilitarian
and retributive motives are often correlated, previous researchers
have argued that conceptualizing them as distinct constructs and
comparing their role in punishment is grounded in well-established
and developed theories of punishment and has been empirically
validated (Carlsmith et al., 2002).
The 3-item utilitarian motives scale assessed the extent to which
participants perceived the offender to be a dangerous threat from
which to protect society: (a) “David poses a danger to society,” (b)
“David is at a high risk for reoffending,” and (c) “David is a cold and
calculating ‘superpredator’.” Participants indicated their agreement on
5-point scales ranging from Not at all to Very much. This is a scale
utilized in previous research (Salerno, Najdowski et al., 2010), which
was initially adapted from items used in prior research about juvenile
offenders in general (Haegerich, Salerno, & Bottoms, 2013; Vidal &
Skeem, 2007) and sex offenders specifically (Proeve & Howells,
2006).
Moral outrage is a critical component of retributive motives
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008), and is used to assess retributive
motivation (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Thus, the 4-item retributive
motives scale was composed of the following items: (a) “I feel
morally outraged by what David did to his alleged victim,” (b) “I
feel a desire to hurt the defendant David,” (c) “I feel a compelling
need to punish David,” and (d) “I believe David is evil to the core.”
Participants indicated their agreement on 5-point scales ranging
from Not at all to Very much. This scale was adapted from items
used in previous research (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Darley et al.,
2000; Salerno, Najdowski, et al., 2010; Salerno & Peter-Hagene,
2013; Skitka et al., 2004).
Explicit gay stereotypes. Endorsement of explicit, sexually rel-
evant antigay stereotypes was measured with a reliable scale ( 
.85) comprising two items from the Stereotypes about Gays and Child
Abuse Scale (Wiley & Bottoms, 2013, “Homosexual men are likely to
sexually abuse children,” and “Gay men should never be given posi-
tions of trust in caring for children”) and a third item (“Gay men are
promiscuous.”) Participants indicated their agreement on 5-point
scales ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Manipulation checks. Participants reported David’s age and
the victim’s gender.
Demographics. Participants indicated (a) their race, (b) their
gender, (c) their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from
Extremely liberal to Extremely conservative, and (d) whether a friend,
family member, or close acquaintance had revealed that he or she is
gay.
Results and Discussion
To test our hypothesis that participants would exhibit discrim-
ination against gay (vs. heterosexual) juvenile offenders—but not
adult offenders—we conducted an ordinal regression predicting
punishment with dummy codes for offender age (0  16 years old,
1  35 years old) and sexual orientation (0  heterosexual sex,
1  gay sex), and the interaction. Odds ratios are reported below,
which reflect the ratio of the odds of supporting harsher registry
laws in one condition (e.g., a gay offender) compared to another
(e.g., a heterosexual offender).1 Given the greater diversity of our
1 For example, if participants who read about a gay juvenile demon-
strated a 60% probability of supporting registration and a 40% probability
of not supporting registration, their odds of supporting registration for this
individual would be .60/.40  1.5. If participants who read about a
heterosexual juvenile demonstrated an odds of supporting registration
(versus no registration) of .5, the odds ratio would be 1.5/.5  3. The
interpretation of this odds ratio would be that participants who read about
a gay juvenile were 3 times more likely to support harsher registry laws






































































































401GAY BIAS AND PUNISHMENT
sample relative to student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gos-
ling, 2011), we controlled for demographic variables in all analy-
ses to increase the sensitivity of our tests by accounting for the
variance that the demographics explain in the dependent variable
(Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2002).
This model revealed that offender age, OR  5.97, Wald 
14.88, p  .0001, and offender sexual orientation, OR  2.78,
Wald  5.69, p  .02, were significant predictors of punitiveness.
These effects were qualified, however, by the predicted offender
age by sexual orientation interaction, OR  .28, Wald  4.03, p 
.04.2 Simple slope analyses confirmed that participants showed no
discrimination against gay (vs. heterosexual) adult offenders (i.e.,
35 years old) who had sex with a 14-year-old, OR  .78, Wald 
.28, p  .59. However, in the more ambiguous case of sex between
juvenile peers (i.e., the 16-year-old offender), participants were
significantly more punitive when the juveniles engaged in gay
versus heterosexual sex, OR  2.78, Wald  5.69, p  .02 (see
Table 1).3 These results are consistent with contemporary preju-
dice theories (e.g., aversive racism, Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986).
Although the legal system requires that laws be applied equally
(U.S. Const. art. XI, & 1), the ambiguity surrounding punishment
decisions for juveniles engaged in consensual peer sex resulted in
more severe punishment of gay, compared to heterosexual, youth.
However, when the context was normatively unambiguous (i.e.,
adult–juvenile sex) discrimination against gay offenders did not
manifest.
Examining the interaction in this fashion (i.e., by comparing the
effect of sexual orientation for juvenile vs. adult offenders) tests
our theoretical hypothesis that in ambiguous (but not clear-cut)
contexts, people would discriminate against gay offenders. Reex-
amining the interaction pattern the other way (i.e., testing the effect
of offender age for heterosexual vs. gay offenders) reveals the
practical importance of these findings by demonstrating the power
of discrimination against gay offenders in eliminating what should
normatively be a very strong offender age effect. That is, one
would expect that people would assign significantly greater pun-
ishment to a 35-year-old offender who had sex with a 14-year-old
victim, compared to a 16-year-old offender who had sex with a
14-year-old victim. For heterosexual offenders, this was the case:
participants were, not surprisingly, much more punitive toward the
35- (vs. 16-) year-old who had sex with a 14-year-old, OR 
183.09, Wald  14.88, p  .001—a very large effect. Indeed, this
age difference reflects the difference between more prototypical
sex offenders (i.e., an older adult targeting a minor) versus two
peers engaging in a consensual sexual relationship. When the
offender was gay, however, this age effect disappeared. People
were equally punitive toward the 16- and 35-year-old gay offend-
ers who had sex with a 14-year-old boy, OR  5.97, Wald  1.47,
p  .22. People gave the heterosexual 16-year-old offender “a
break” relative to the 35-year-old offender because he engaged in
consensual sex with a peer; however, this leniency was not af-
forded to gay youth—they were punished just as harshly as a
35-year-old offender preying on an underage minor.
Moderation by explicit endorsement of gay stereotypes?
To test our hypothesis that the antigay discrimination in punish-
ment would be independent of participants’ willingness to endorse
explicit gay stereotypes, we conducted an ordinal regression pre-
dicting punishment with all of the same predictors as the last
analyses, but with the addition of participants’ centered explicit
stereotype scores and all potential interactions with the manipula-
tions. The explicit stereotype scale was a significant predictor of
punitiveness overall (regardless of the offenders’ sexual orienta-
tion), OR  2.07, Wald  5.87, p  .02. Critically—and consis-
tent with our predictions—explicit endorsement of gay stereotypes
did not moderate the sexual orientation main effect, or the pre-
dicted offender age by offender sexual orientation interaction
reported above, Walds 1.58, ps  .21. Further, the offender age
by offender sexual orientation interaction, reported above, re-
mained significant with explicit endorsement of gay stereotypes
and its interactions in the model, OR  .22, Wald  6.60, p 
.02.4 Thus, although explicit endorsement of antigay stereotypes
appears to be related to general punitiveness overall, it did not
predict differential discrimination against a gay versus heterosex-
ual offender. In other words, discrimination against gay (vs. het-
erosexual) juvenile offenders was not limited to those who were
willing to endorse explicit gay stereotypes.
Mediation analyses: Punishment motives. Next, we con-
ducted mediation analyses to test whether utilitarian and/or retrib-
2 Some of the demographics significantly explained unique variance in
registry support. Racial minorities were more likely to support harsher
registry laws than were White participants, OR  2.32, Wald  6.40, p 
.01. Women are more likely to support harsher registry laws than were
men, OR  1.95, Wald  4.30, p  .04. Political orientation, and having
a friend/family member who is gay did not significantly explain unique
variance, Bs  .41, ps  23.
3 Anti-gay prejudice is often stronger in men versus women (Herek,
1988). We tested whether our effects were moderated by participant gender
by conducting an ordinal regression predicting punishment with the same
dummy codes for offender age and sexual orientation, the interaction,
participant gender, all potential gender interactions with the manipulations,
and all other demographic covariates. Neither participant gender, nor any
interactions with gender were significant, Walds  .44, ps  .50. The
offender age by offender sexual orientation interaction, however, was no
longer significant, OR  .45, Wald  .77, p  .38. There was a significant
main effect of offender age, such that participants were more punitive
toward the 35- versus 16-year-old offender, OR  6.62, Wald  8.61, p 
.003. There was also a marginal effect of offender sexual orientation, such
that participants were more punitive toward a gay (versus heterosexual)
offender overall, B  2.56, Wald  2.94, p  .09.
4 Explicit anti-gay prejudice unexpectedly interacted with offender age,
OR  2.69, Wald  6.01, p  .01, such that explicit anti-gay prejudice
predicted punitiveness when the offender was a juvenile, OR  2.07,
Wald  5.87, p  .02, but was not predictive when the offender was 35
years old, OR  .78, Wald  .82, p  .36 (regardless of sexual orienta-
tion). Thus, endorsement of anti-gay stereotypes was associated with
punitiveness toward all juveniles—not just toward gay juveniles.
Table 1
Study 1. Number (%) of Participants Who Chose Each
Registration Outcome
Heterosexual offender Gay offender
16-year-old offender
Should not register 16 (43%) 12 (27%)
Should register, but not online 12 (32%) 12 (27%)
Should register online 9 (24%) 21 (47%)
35-year-old offender
Should not register 6 (14%) 7 (17%)
Should register, but not online 11 (25%) 9 (22%)






































































































402 SALERNO, MURPHY, AND BOTTOMS
utive motives explain the effect of juveniles’ sexual orientation on
punishment decisions. Given that we have found support for both
in previous research (Salerno, Najdowski et al., 2010), we exam-
ined a dual-mediator model testing whether the two punishment
motives independently drive the effect of offender sexual orienta-
tion on punishment in parallel processes. We used MPlus to
conduct indirect path analyses based on 5,000 bootstrapped sam-
ples. All of the following mediation analyses include the same
main effects (offender gender and sexual orientation) and demo-
graphic controls as the analyses reported above. Significant indi-
rect effects are indicated by confidence intervals (CIs) that do not
include zero (Hayes, 2013)—that is, the lower and upper bound
confidence interval values are both negative or both positive and
therefore do not bridge zero. All utilitarian and retributive moti-
vation means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2.
This analysis revealed that the indirect effect of offender age by
sexual orientation interaction on punishment through retributive
motives was significant, B  .29, 95% CI  .60, .01. In
contrast, the indirect effect of the interaction on punishment
through utilitarian motives was not significant, B  .18, 95%
CI  .42, .02.5 Thus, discrimination against gay juvenile (but not
adult) offenders was driven by retributive motives (i.e., moral
outrage), rather than utilitarian motives (i.e., concern about pro-
tecting society)—despite the latter being the stated legislative
purpose of the registry.
In summary, we found that participants were more supportive of
sex offender registration for gay (vs. heterosexual) juveniles (i.e.,
a more ambiguous judgment)—but not for adult offenders (i.e., a
less ambiguous judgment). Consistent with the aversive racism
framework, with an adult offender the normatively clear choice
was to punish an adult who has sex with a child harshly—
regardless of offender sexual orientation. It is when the appropri-
ateness of applying these laws was ambiguous (i.e., when the
offender was also a child) that participants’ prejudice against gay
individuals affected their judgments. The dual-mediator model
confirmed that this bias was driven by increased moral outrage
toward the gay (vs. heterosexual) juvenile offender rather than
believing the gay juvenile offender was more of a threat to society.
We argue that these discrimination results are driven by partic-
ipants’ prejudice against a gay (vs. heterosexual) offender. Study 1
leaves room for a few alternative explanations, however, that we
address in Study 2. First, one could argue that—as a previous
reviewer pointed out—because the gay sex act was videotaped in
Study 1, participants’ retributive motives and punishment might be
driven by participants’ perceptions that a gay (vs. heterosexual)
sex videotape might be more socially stigmatizing for the victim in
the future. Thus, in Study 2 we used a different scenario to ensure
that the antigay discrimination we saw in Study 1 was not idio-
syncratically confined to a case in which a record (i.e., a videotape)
of the gay sex act existed. Second, one could argue that perhaps
people’s judgments were influenced by the victim’s gender rather
than the offender’s sexual orientation. That is, perhaps people are
more protective of a male victim than a female victim—regardless
of the offender’s gender. There have been very few victim gender
effects on case judgments about sexual abuse cases of children in
the literature—if anything, people are more skeptical of boy vic-
tims of child sexual abuse than girl victims (Bottoms, Golding,
Stevenson, Wiley & Yozwiak, 2007). Even still, we fully crossed
offender and victim gender to address this possibility and to test
whether people have different reactions to gay versus lesbian
juvenile offenders.
Study 2
In Study 2, we examined whether the discrimination against gay
(vs. heterosexual) juveniles in Study 1 would replicate to another
sex offense punishment context that is relatively ambiguous when
applied to juvenile offenders: sexting (i.e., sending naked photo-
graphs via cellphone). Although sexting is fairly common among
teenagers (Strassberg, McKinnon, Sustaita, & Rullo, 2013), juve-
niles have been registered as sex offenders for sexting (Eraker,
2010; e.g., A.H. v. State of Florida, 2007). Sexting cases have
sparked a national debate regarding whether this punishment fits
this crime (e.g., Hoffman, 2011). We expected to replicate the
finding that people would punish a gay (vs. heterosexual) male
juvenile more harshly and that this punishment bias would be
mediated by retributive, but not utilitarian, motivation in a sexting
scenario.
We also extend Study 1 in several ways. First, we extended
contemporary prejudice theories by testing whether discrimination
against gay male juveniles would generalize to lesbian juveniles in
ambiguous punishment contexts. Similar to racism research that
often assumes biases and their underlying mechanisms targeting
one subgroup (e.g., Black men) will generalize to another (e.g.,
Black women; Sommers & Babbitt, 2010), social psychology has
expended much less empirical attention on lesbians as targets of
discrimination than gay men. We predicted that the discrimination
against gay male juveniles in Study 1 would not extend to lesbian
juveniles for several reasons. First, people’s explicit attitudes
toward lesbians are less negative than toward gay men (e.g.,
Herek, 2000), thus they might be less punitive of sexting by
lesbian juveniles relative to gay male juveniles. Second, concep-
tions of manhood are grounded in “antifemininity”—that is, men
demonstrate their masculinity by avoiding femininity in their be-
havior, whereas conceptions of femininity are not grounded in
“antimasculinity.” As a result, cross-gender behaviors are pun-
ished more harshly for men than for women (for review, Vandello
& Bosson, 2013). Thus, people might punish boys for same-gender
sexual behavior (sexting another boy) more harshly than girls
(sexting another girl).
5 We found the same pattern of results when we conducted two single-
mediator models that did not control for the two mediators’ overlapping
variance. Further, previous reviewers have expressed curiosity regarding
alternative models, specifically serial models in which these two punish-
ment motives affect punishment through a serial process (rather than
independent effects working in parallel). We did not find support for these
models. Specifically, we conducted path analyses to explore two alterna-
tive serial indirect effect models. In both models we included offender age,
offender sexual orientation, the interaction, and demographic controls as
predictors, and punishment as the ordinal dependent variable. As media-
tors, we included retributive and utilitarian motives. The two separate serial
mediator models tested the indirect effect of the offender age by sexual
orientation interaction on punishment through (a) retributive motives and
then utilitarian motives and (b) utilitarian motives and then retributive
models. The results from these two models revealed that the indirect effect
of the interaction on punishment through retributive and then utilitarian
motives was not significant, B  .14, 95% CI  .89, .02. The indirect
effect of the interaction on punishment through utilitarian and then retrib-






































































































403GAY BIAS AND PUNISHMENT
Second, we extended Study 1 by examining whether retributive
motives would not only increase punishment of the perpetrator (as
in Study 1), but would also carry over to increase punishment of
the victim of the offense. From a utilitarian perspective, there is no
obvious utility in punishing the victim and therefore we would not
expect the victim of a gay offender to be punished more harshly
than a victim of a heterosexual offender. Yet, Study 1 identified
retributive motives as the impetus for punishing a gay offender
more severely than a heterosexual offender. Moral outrage is
fueled by a combination of anger and disgust toward moral trans-
gressions (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). The effects of emo-
tions—and in particular, anger—can be transferred to subsequent
judgments or targets (e.g., Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999).
Inspired by these findings, punishment researchers have theorized
that perhaps the moral emotions fueling retributive motives might
carryover from punishment of the perpetrator to other judgments
(Darley & Pittman, 2003). We tested the hypothesis that moral
outrage toward a gay offender might activate generalized retribu-
tive motivations that could be satisfied not only by punishing the
perpetrator, but also by punishing the victim.
Sexting cases provide an interesting context in which to test this
hypothesis. In the prosecution of these cases, the legal system
often designates one juvenile as the “perpetrator” (e.g., often the
sender of a naked photograph) and one juvenile as the “victim”
(e.g., often the receiver of a naked photograph), even though both
juveniles involved in this kind of scenario can be prosecuted as sex
offenders (e.g., A.H. v. State of Florida, 2007; Eraker, 2010). The
sender is technically guilty of producing and distributing child
pornography and the receiver is technically guilty of possessing
child pornography. To be clear, we are not arguing that it is
appropriate to label the sender as the perpetrator—doing so denies
the possibilities that sexting can be consensual and mutual or that
a sender can be coerced by a receiver into sending the message in
the first place. Regardless of the appropriateness of these prose-
cution labels and strategies, we focus on investigating the public’s
reaction to these scenarios, because the sexting context provides an
interesting extension of the victim blame literature given that the
legal victim can technically be prosecuted and punished. Further,
this legal implication enabled us to test the hypothesis that reading
about gay (vs. heterosexual) juvenile perpetrators would increase
participants’ retributive motives and, in turn, punitiveness toward
not only the legally designated perpetrator (the sender), but would
also spill over to the legally designated victim (receiver).
Method
Participants and procedure. Participants were 167 voter-
eligible adults recruited from Mechanical Turk. Seventeen partic-
ipants were excluded for failing to correctly report the offender
and/or victim gender. The remaining 151 participants were 42%
women; 54% White, 34% Asian, 4% Black, 3% Hispanic; with a
mean age of 35 (SD  12) years. Participants read a description of
sex offender registries from Study 1 and current child pornography
laws designed to make it clear that both juveniles’ actions legally
constituted child pornography. Next, they read one of four versions
of a vignette based on an actual case (Feyerick & Steffen, 2009)
depicting one juvenile texting a naked self-portrait photograph to
another juvenile (see Appendix). The participants read that either
a girl or boy sent the photograph (sender gender) to either a
different-sex or same-sex peer (sender sexual orientation).
Measures. Participants completed the same measures from
Study 1 with a few exceptions. First, because both the sender and
the receiver of the text were charged with sex offenses, participants
completed all measures twice—once about each juvenile. Thus,
ratings about the sender and receiver constituted a repeated mea-
sure, within-subjects variable. This allowed us to test whether the
effect of sender gender and sender sexual orientation would in-
crease punitiveness toward just the sender (i.e., the perpetrator) or
spill over to the victim and increase punitiveness toward both
juveniles equally.
Results and Discussion
Unlike Study 1, the current study includes nested data (i.e.,
repeated measures about the sender and receiver within individual
participants) and therefore required ordinal multilevel modeling.
The model included the between-subjects dummy codes for sender
gender and sexual orientation (Level 2) and all interactions, along
with—similar to Study 1—participant gender, racial minority sta-
tus, and political orientation as demographic controls. This anal-
ysis revealed the predicted interaction between sender gender and
sexual orientation, OR  4.18, z  2.21, p  .03. Consistent with
Study 1, simple slopes analyses revealed that, when a boy sent a
sexting message, participants were marginally more punitive when
he was gay (i.e., sexted another boy) than when he was hetero-
sexual (i.e., sexted a girl), B  1.76, z  1.73, p  .08. This
punishment bias against same-gender sexting did not manifest
when the perpetrator was a girl, OR  1.95, z  1.51, p  .13.
Table 2
Mean (SD) Utilitarian and Retributive Motives in Studies 1 and 2 as a Function of
Offender Characteristics
Study 1 Study 2
Offender age Offender gender
16 YO 35 YO Marginal Boy Girl Marginal
Utilitarian motives
Heterosexual offender 3.36 (2.03) 4.72 (1.95) 4.09 (2.09) 1.92 (1.10) 2.07 (1.00) 1.99 (1.06)
Gay offender 3.57 (1.67) 4.02 (1.55) 3.78 (1.62) 2.29 (1.10) 1.83 (.93) 2.09 (1.05)
Marginal 3.48 (1.83) 4.38 (1.79) 3.93 (1.86) 2.10 (1.12) 1.97 (.98) 2.04 (1.05)
Retributive motives
Heterosexual offender 2.60 (1.37) 3.94 (1.11) 3.32 (1.40) 2.06 (1.44) 2.11 (1.21) 2.08 (1.33)
Gay offender 2.92 (1.33) 3.42 (1.39) 3.16 (1.38) 2.45 (1.27) 1.70 (.96) 2.13 (1.20)






































































































404 SALERNO, MURPHY, AND BOTTOMS
Removing the demographic controls revealed even stronger
effects. The interaction between sender gender and sexual orien-
tation was significant, OR  4.62, z  2.73, p  .01.6 Simple
slopes analyses revealed that, when a boy sexted, participants were
significantly more punitive when he was gay than when he was
heterosexual, OR  2.08, z  2.00, p  .04. When a girl sexted,
this effect somewhat reversed: participants were marginally less
punitive toward the juveniles when she was gay versus heterosex-
ual, OR  .45, z  1.90, p  .06.7 Thus, in a sexting scenario,
the punishment bias replicated for gay boys but not lesbian girls—
participants were actually somewhat more lenient when a girl sent
a sexting message to another girl (vs. boy) (see Table 3).
Do punishment biases extend to the victim? Next, we tested
whether the interactive effect of sender gender and sexual orien-
tation would be significant for only punishment of the sender (i.e.,
the perpetrator), or alternatively on the punishment of both the
sender and the passive receiver (i.e., the victim). The model
included a within-subjects dummy code indicating the partici-
pants’ ratings of the sender versus receiver (Level 1), between-
subjects dummy codes for sender gender and sexual orientation
(Level 2), and all interactions. Participants were, not surprisingly,
more punitive toward the sender than the receiver of the text
overall, OR  .39, t(271)  2.53, p  .02. More critical to our
hypothesis, however, the juvenile’s role (sender vs. receiver) did
not interact with any predictors, all zs  1.17, ps  .24. In other
words, the effects of the sender gender and sexual orientation on
punishment did not depend on whether the participant was rating
the sender or receiver (see Table 3 for percentages). The predicted
interaction between sender gender and sexual orientation remained
marginally significant in this model, OR  4.53, t(136)  1.82,
p  .07. Thus, although people were (not surprisingly) more
punitive toward the perpetrator than the victim overall, reading
about a gay (vs. heterosexual) male perpetrator tended to increase
punitiveness toward both the gay perpetrator and his victim—even
though there was no indication that the receiver of the message did
anything to contribute to the situation (aside from perhaps failing
to delete the text message before being caught). This suggests that
perhaps individuals who violate moral values (i.e., a gay boy
sexting another boy) are more likely to inspire retributive punish-
ment motives that are satisfied by punishing not only the perpe-
trator, but also the passive receiver of the sexting message.
Mediation analyses: Punishment motives. We ran a model
conceptually similar to the dual-mediator model from Study 1.
Because the data were nested, however, we had to change our
analysis strategy. We again tested a model in which both retribu-
tive and utilitarian goals are simultaneous mediators of the signif-
icant interaction effect on punishment. We were unable to conduct
bootstrapping analyses again, however, given that MPlus cannot
accommodate bootstrapping with multilevel data. As a result, we
conducted more traditional mediation analyses (Baron & Kenny,
1986; MacKinnon, 2008) that can accommodate nested data with
multilevel ordinal regression equations. (Means and standard de-
viations for the utilitarian and retributive motive scales are re-
ported in Table 2).
The sender gender by sexual orientation interaction significantly
predicted retributive, OR  2.25, z  2.20, p  .03, and utilitarian
motives, OR  1.82, z  2.10, p  .04. When the interaction and
mediators were included in the same equation, the effect of the
interaction on punishment was no longer significant, OR  4.81,
z  1.52, p  .13. Retributive, OR  2.23, z  3.13, p  .002, and
utilitarian, OR  1.73, z  2.35, p  .02, motives both signifi-
cantly predicted punishment. Thus, punishment bias was again
driven by retributive motives, but in this situation, also by utili-
tarian motives.8
General Discussion
These findings are the first to apply contemporary prejudice
theoretical frameworks to sexual prejudice in punishment contexts
by demonstrating discrimination against gay (vs. heterosexual)
juvenile—but not adult—sex offenders. That is, people exhibited
discrimination against gay offenders when the punishment judg-
ment was ambiguous (i.e., consensual peer sex), but not when the
judgment was unambiguous (i.e., adult–juvenile sex). Specifically,
people were willing to “give the kid a break” for having consen-
sual oral sex with a peer (even though it is technically illegal)—
but this accommodation was extended only to heterosexual juve-
niles. In fact, gay juveniles who had peer sex were punished as
harshly as gay 35-year-old offenders who had sex with a 14-year-
old.
Further, we contributed to the prejudice literature by demon-
strating differential discrimination reactions to gay versus lesbian
juveniles engaged in prosecutable sexual activity. In Study 2,
antigay discrimination replicated for gay boys but not lesbian girls
in a sexting case. In fact, the gay discrimination effect reversed,
such that people were somewhat less punitive toward a lesbian (vs.
heterosexual) girl who sent a sexting message. The punishment
discrimination was driven by retributive motives in both studies,
and utilitarian motives also played a mediating role in Study 2.
This research extends previous demonstrations of the importance
of retributive punishment motives (e.g., Carlsmith & Darley, 2008)
to their role, specifically, in extralegal bias against stigmatized
offenders. The sexual discrimination effect was not limited to
participants who explicitly endorsed gay stereotypes (Study 1).
6 Racial minorities were again more likely to support harsher registry
laws than were White participants, OR  3.82, z  4.48, p  .001.
Participant gender and political orientation did not significantly explain
unique variance, Bs  .42, ps  14. Due to experimenter error, familiarity
with gay individuals was not assessed in this study.
7 We again reran our model with participant gender and all possible
gender interactions to test whether the gender by sexual orientation inter-
action was moderated by participant gender. Consistent with Study 1,
participant gender, nor any interactions with gender were significant, zs 
1.31, ps  .10. However, as in Study 1, when participant gender and its
interactions are included in the model, the interaction of interest (i.e.,
sender gender by sexual orientation interaction), is no longer significant,
OR  2.83, z  1.34, p  .18. Instead there was a significant main effect
of sexual orientation, such that overall, participants were less punitive
toward a gay (versus heterosexual) offender, OR  .03, z  1.98, p 
.05.
8 To be consistent with Study 1, we also conducted bootstrapping
analyses similar to the mediation analysis from Study 1—even though this
analysis is not ideal because it does not account for the non-independence
of the nested data. Based on 5,000 bootstrapping samples, the indirect
effects of the offender sender by sexual orientation interaction on punish-
ment through retributive motives, B  .16, 95% CI  .15, .59, and
utilitarian motives, B  .14, 95% CI  .11, .55, were both significant.
Thus, both traditional Baron and Kenny mediation analyses using multi-
level models, and bootstrapping analyses that do not utilize multilevel
models both consistently reveal that retributive and utilitarian motives






































































































405GAY BIAS AND PUNISHMENT
Either people’s bias against gay offenders was strong enough to
override individual differences in prejudice, or—consistent with
theories of contemporary prejudice—the punishment decisions
tapped into more contemporary forms of bias that are not reflected
in explicit measures. Finally, we found that reading about gay
juvenile offenders activated a retribution-based desire to punish,
which was satisfied by harsher punishments of both the sender of
a sexting message (i.e., the perpetrator), as well as the receiver of
the sexting message (i.e., the victim). The perpetrator and the
victim both received harsher punishments when the perpetrator
was gay.
What is it about an offense that involves sexual activity between
two male juveniles that results in a more punitive response than
any other gender combination? One could argue that the effect
might be driven by a desire to protect the male victims from gay
offenders, rather than by a particularly punitive response toward
gay offenders. People might be more concerned and sympathetic
toward male victims of a gay offense compared to either female
victims of a gay offense, or victims of heterosexual offenses. We
would argue, however, that if this were the explanation, it would
be difficult to explain why people (a) were not also more punitive
toward an adult male offender with an underage male (vs. female)
victim (Study 1), and (b) wanted to punish male victims of gay
sexting more than male victims of heterosexual sexting (Study 2).
We would argue that negative reactions to gay male offenders
constitute a better explanation for the current findings. Although
the gay discrimination effect did not depend on the participants’
explicit endorsement of gay stereotypes, the current findings do
not necessarily rule out stereotypes and prejudice as an explana-
tion. Indeed, researchers have documented not only that gay men
are stereotyped as child molesters (Herek, 1991, 2002; Wiley &
Bottoms, 2013), but also that endorsement of these stereotypes
increases mock jurors’ proprosecution judgments against gay de-
fendants charged with child sexual abuse (Wiley & Bottoms,
2013). Stereotypes and negative attitudes can be activated and
affect our behavior outside of our awareness—even if we do not
endorse the stereotypes on explicit measures (Devine, 1989). This
is especially the case when prejudice against a group becomes less
normatively acceptable. The current studies were not designed to
test the role of implicit stereotypes in punishment biases, but this
is a compelling future direction that would build on the punish-
ment findings.
Although it plays a clear role, antigay discrimination alone
cannot fully account for our findings, which are also consistent
with “intersectional” approaches to social identity research. Inter-
sectional research demonstrates the limitations of investigating
gender, sexual orientation, race, and other aspects of social iden-
tities independently, and instead focuses on the unique effects that
emerge when researchers examine combinations of these identities
(e.g., Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Reid & Comas-Diaz, 1990;
Warner & Shields, 2013). Indeed, sexual prejudice can stem from
negative reactions to violations of traditional sexual orientation
(i.e., engaging in same-gender sexual activity), but also to viola-
tions of traditional gender roles (i.e., men acting feminine, women
acting masculine; Lehavot & Lambert, 2007). Discriminatory pun-
ishment of gay male juveniles in our study appears to be a result
of both sexual and gender discrimination. That is, we did not find
discrimination against all gay individuals—only gay male offend-
ers; and, we did not find discrimination against all male individ-
uals—only gay male offenders. Thus, it appears that offenders
who are gay and male are particularly stigmatized.
Why might people be more punitive toward gay male juveniles
than other groups? These results are conceptually consistent with
previous research indicating that cross-gender behaviors are pun-
ished more harshly for men than for women. These previous
findings have been explained by differences in conceptualizations
of masculinity (which include antifemininity) versus femininity
(which do not include antimasculinity) (Vandello & Bosson,
2013). Thus, our findings might be due to differential expectations
of what it means to be masculine and what it means to be feminine.
Inversion theory argues that gay men are perceived as feminine
and lesbians perceived as masculine (Schneider, 2004). Because
expression of sexuality is less acceptable from women than from
men (Crawford & Popp, 2003), gay boys might be punished more
for expressing sexuality (i.e., sexting) than straight boys because
they are expected to be more feminine. Their “sexually aggressive”
behavior (i.e., sexting) is in violation of this expected (more
feminine) gender role, and thus they may be punished harshly. In
contrast, lesbians may be punished less than straight girls for
expressing sexuality because lesbians are expected to be more
masculine (Schneider, 2004). Acting within masculine gender-
consistent roles by behaving in a sexually aggressive manner
(sending a sext) is thus less likely to engender harsh punishment.
That is, perhaps straight boys (relative to gay boys) and lesbian
girls (relative to straight girls) are punished less for sexting be-
cause they are expected to be the more “masculine” groups, for
which being sexually aggressive is more acceptable. Thus, it is
important to acknowledge that reactions to gay targets might
Table 3
Study 2. Number (%) of Participants Who Chose Each Registration Outcome, as a Function of
Sender Versus Receiver Ratings and Sender Characteristics
Ratings of sender (“Perpetrator”) Ratings of receiver (“Victim”)
Heterosexual sender Gay sender Heterosexual sender Gay sender
Girl sender
Should not register 22 (59%) 23 (80%) 28 (78%) 26 (92%)
Should register, but not online 8 (22%) 3 (10%) 5 (14%) 2 (7%)
Should register online 7 (19%) 3 (10%) 3 (8%) 0 (0%)
Boy sender
Should not register 25 (64%) 19 (51%) 34 (87%) 25 (68%)
Should register, but not online 9 (23%) 7 (19%) 3 (8%) 5 (13%)






































































































406 SALERNO, MURPHY, AND BOTTOMS
depend on additional aspects of the target’s social identity, such as
gender.
The finding that people treat gay and lesbian individuals differ-
ently contradicts previous studies that demonstrate equal discrim-
ination against gay and lesbian offenders (e.g., Hebl et al., 2002;
Hendren & Blank, 2009). One potential explanation is that the
present study is the only one to focus on sexual situations, which
heighten the salience of gender norms (Hundhammer & Muss-
weiler, 2012). In contexts where gender norms are not particularly
salient, as in previous studies, gay men and women may experi-
ence similar prejudice because both groups violate traditional
sexual orientation (i.e., Hebl et al., 2002; Hendren & Blank, 2009).
Yet, in a sexual context like the present study, salient gender
norms might influence people’s judgments of gay men differently
than lesbians.
More research is needed to explore additional potential expla-
nations for leniency toward lesbian (vs. heterosexual) girls, such as
the trivialization of harm elicited by lesbian sex, the eroticizing of
lesbian sex (Whitley, Wiederman, & Wryobeck, 1999), or beliefs
that girls’ sexuality is more malleable than boys’ sexuality (Peplau,
2003). That is, people might perceive a gay male juvenile’s sex-
uality as more fixed—interpreting a sexting message as an indi-
cation of inherently deviant sexuality. In contrast, people might
perceive a lesbian girl’s sexuality as more malleable or change-
able—interpreting a sexting message as an indication of experi-
mentation or “goofing around.” These differential perceptions of
girls’ and boys’ same-gender sexual activity might lead people to
view it as differentially harmful or threatening, and in turn, worthy
of different degrees of punishment.
Law and Policy Implications
Supreme Court decisions recognize that adolescents should be
spared from serious punishment because their psychological imma-
turity should reduce culpability (Steinberg, Cauffman, Wooland, Gra-
ham, & Banich, 2009). Sex offender registration is associated with
often debilitating lifelong outcomes (Levenson et al., 2007), yet many
participants decided this harsh level of punishment was appropriate
for juveniles engaging in consensual activities with peers. Sixty-five
percent of participants believed a juvenile who engaged in consensual
oral sex with a peer should be registered in some form (57% when the
juvenile was heterosexual, 73% when the juvenile was gay); and over
a third of participants thought the juvenile should be registered pub-
licly online (24% when the juvenile was heterosexual, 47% when the
juvenile was gay). Given that roughly 40% of 15 to 17-year-olds
report engaging in oral sex (Mosher, Chandra, & Jones, 2005), the
majority of our participants supported the most extreme form of sex
offender registration for an activity in which close to half of teenagers
engage.
The level of overall punitiveness toward the juvenile offenders
were somewhat higher in Study 1 than in Study 2, B  .373,
Wald  2.68, p  .10. For example 29% chose the harshest
registry option in Study 1, whereas only 18% chose this option in
Study 2. This finding is not surprising, given the severity differ-
ences between sexting and oral sex cases. This punishment differ-
ence between case types is consistent with previous research
demonstrating that support for juvenile sex offender registration
laws depends on offense severity (Salerno, Najdowski et al.,
2010). Mandatory sex offender registration for any sex offense
(i.e., not allowing judges to take offense severity into account) is
required in 26 states (Salerno, Stevenson et al., 2010). The current
findings suggest that this requirement is not in line with public
sentiment—as long as the offenders are heterosexual. Yet, a sub-
stantial percentage of participants still thought juveniles should be
registered as sex offenders for sexting (37%) and even merely
receiving a sexting message (20%), which do not even involve
physical contact. Given that roughly 20–40% of high school
students admit to sexting (Strassberg et al., 2013), a substantial
percentage of our participants support sex offender registration for
an activity in which roughly a third of teenagers engage. Particu-
larly concerning is the fact that many teenagers engaged in sexting
report not having considered the legal ramifications at all (Strass-
berg et al., 2013). In fact, almost half of young adults sampled
were even unaware that juveniles could be registered for having
consensual oral sex with an underage peer (Stevenson, Najdowski,
& Wiley, 2013).
This surprising punitiveness might be a reflection of our
society’s visceral moral outrage toward crimes labeled as “sex
offenses.” When people are asked to give their opinion about
punishment policies for sex offenders in general and afterward
report what kind of crime they had been envisioning, most
people spontaneously envisioned a severe, violent, coercive sex
offense (e.g., rape)—including when they are asked about ju-
venile offenders. In turn, those who spontaneously envision
more (vs. less) severe offenses were four times more likely to
support sex offender registration (Salerno et al., 2010). Reading
about an act that is characterized as a sex offense might increase
moral outrage and, in turn, punitiveness. Future research could
test whether participants are less punitive if the same behavior
is framed as a parental or school disciplinary issue, rather than
a “sex offense.”
This research demonstrates that the ambiguity surrounding
whether laws and punishments designed for adults should be
applied to juveniles provides a vehicle for discrimination
against stigmatized youth. To the extent that judges and attor-
neys hold similar biases, gay youth might be particularly vul-
nerable to public stigmatization on sex offender registries,
thereby potentially contributing to institutionalized prejudice
against gay youth. These experiments bolster previous archival
evidence that gay youth may be particularly vulnerable to sex
offender registration (Craun & Kernsmith, 2006) by providing
the first experimental evidence for a causal effect of juveniles’
sexual orientation on punitiveness. Our findings are also rele-
vant for nations with similar registries (e.g., Australia, United
Kingdom) and similarly negative attitudes toward homosexual-
ity that affect law (Ottosson, 2010).
Conclusion
This research reveals how contemporary sexual prejudice can
manifest in the criminal justice system, causing serious and po-
tentially lifelong consequences for juveniles: public stigmatization
as a sex offender. While there is much controversy and moral
debate surrounding the prosecution and registration of teenagers
for consensual sexual activity in general, the present findings are
the first to reveal that current sex offender laws provide a context
that disadvantages gay youth because their sexual behavior rouses






































































































407GAY BIAS AND PUNISHMENT
demonstrates that gay juveniles are particularly at risk for discrim-
inatory punishment for their consensual sexual activity with peers,
but also demonstrates that people have different levels of puni-
tiveness toward gay versus lesbian youth.
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Appendix
Study 1 and Study 2 Vignettes
Study 1
David, a [16/35]-year-old male, attended a party at a friend’s
house, during which he and an underage [girl/boy] videotaped the
[girl/boy] performing oral sex on David. Although the victim
stated that the act was consensual, because [she/he] was 14 years
old, [she/he] could not legally provide consent. David was con-
victed of aggravated child molestation.
Study 2
[Jen/David] is a high school sophomore. One night at a party
[she/he] met [Joanna/Scott], a sophomore at a neighboring high
school. The next night [Jen/David] took a naked photograph of
[herself/himself] and texted it to [Joanna’s/Scott’s] cell phone. The
photograph depicted [Jen/David] in a very explicit pose with full
frontal nudity. The photograph was discovered on [Joanna’s/
Scott’s] phone by a teacher, who reported it to the police. Because
[Jen/David] was underage, [Jen/David] was charged with the
production and distribution of child pornography and [Joanna/
Scott] was charged with possessing child pornography.
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